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1.  Introducing a qualitative spectrum in social trust analysis  
Welfare states represent a multidimensional concept that has quantitative as well as 
qualitative characteristics. By defining a package of social rights, social policies are based on the 
principles upon which the maintenance of an individual’s welfare takes place. These principles 
include not only the level of decommodification of those experiencing social risks or certain 
mechanisms of social stratification, but also the particular design of benefit schemes, their form of 
delivery, and the mode of financing.  
Up to now, there is no research that accounts for effects of these characteristics on social 
trust levels. The general tendency in analyzing the relationship between welfare states and social 
trust consists in using either their spending level or Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology 
to describe welfare state development. Using social spending as the measure of welfare state 
development omits from the analysis any kind of qualitative features that describe the principles 
of  welfare provisions to individuals.  
An alternative way to operationalize welfare states is to use Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology based on a three-dimensional approach defined along de-familiarization, de-
commodification, and stratification axes. Nevertheless, this typology also has disadvantages. This 
classification itself is highly criticized. Esping-Andersen’s classification is a continuation of the 
old ‘quantitative tradition’ and only partially accounts for some qualitative dimensions, the effects 
of which are often debated in the literature. The latter includes for instance debates about the 
replacement of passive unemployment schemes with more effective active labor market policies 
(Aust and Arriba, 2005;  Kvist and Ploug, 2003; Taylor-Gooby, 2005a,b), discussions about 
shifting to general and indirect taxation instead of contributory modes of financing (Edlund, 2002; 
Orsini, 2006), or arguments to substitute cash benefits with in-kind benefits.     
The question that arises is ‘why’ we should recognize the existence of the qualitative 
spectrum. The starting point of the argument is that the welfare state itself represents a synthetic 
construct which reflects not only the level of the state’s intervention into societal arrangements, 
but also ‘how’ this intervention happens. This involves using multiple mechanisms in organizing 
and financing the provision of welfare to individuals experiencing social risks for whatever 
reasons. Organizing the same range of social policies, countries differ in ‘how’ these policies are 
designed, implemented, and financed. So it is possible to assume that the same policy may lead to 
different outcomes (in terms of social trust levels) just because its characteristics vary across 
different countries. The diversity of instruments for policy design, implementation, and financing 
thus presupposes particular features of every social policy in each specific country, which reflects 
the principles upon which the organization of welfare provisions at national or sub-national levels 
takes place.  
 On the other hand, the isolation of the qualitative characteristics of social policies is 
necessary for the analysis of their effects on social trust because of the existence of ‘mixed’ effects. 
The latter is based on the assumption that the final outcome in the relationship between social 
policy and social trust is the result of simultaneous interactions between the effects stemming from 
different policy characteristics. It is plausible to assume that these effects may sometimes have the 
opposite sign of influence and hence neutralize each other when analyzed as a whole. It is thus 
necessary to disaggregate the qualitative characteristics and analyze their separate effects on 
interpersonal and institutional trust.  
Finally, this new approach allows us to grasp all possible effects welfare states conducts 
on trust perception from a different prospective and go beyond the usual spending level. The latter 
permits describing welfare state development in more detail. In addition, this approach also 
contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
welfare state development and social trust formation.  
We must thus introduce a qualitative spectrum in the analysis of the relationship between 
welfare states and social trust. This includes isolating social policy characteristics and analyzing 
their separate characteristics on social trust indexes. These characteristics that form the qualitative 
spectrum are:  
(1) general taxation versus contributory financing,  
(2) in-kind versus cash benefits,  
(3) active versus passive labor market policies, 
(4) means-tested versus non means-tested benefits. 
It is impossible to analyze the effects of all qualitative characteristics. Therefore, we will 
choose only one of them to conduct a detailed analysis of the relationship between these 
characteristics and social trust levels on the one hand, and its interaction with the functional 
dimension on the other. Our choice is based on the availability of data. An additional criterion is 
the availability of theory to explain the mechanism that underlies this phenomenon. This 
characteristic is the institutional design of benefits schemes which can be either non means-tested 
or means-tested.  
 
2.The Institutional design and social trust: a theoretical elaboration  
The relationship between welfare states and social trust is subject of many debates that very 
often lead to controversial results. There are studies that suggest that the effects of social policies 
are positive and hence welfare states enhance an individual’s confidence in institutions as well as 
in other people (Knack and Zak, 2001; Patulny, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006;  Szreter, 2002). 
But there are some studies that advocate the opposite. Scholars argue that welfare states crowd-
out social trust (Fukuyama, 2000; De Swaan, 1988). The recent attempt to explain this 
contradiction is the idea of taking into account the institutional design of welfare states or benefit 
schemes. This approach recognizes the possibility of both crowding-in and crowding-out as will 
be shown later. 
The studies about the effects of the institutional design of social provisions on social trust 
represent a new trend in analyzing the relationship between welfare states and trust. They all fit in 
the general framework of the research, which is focused on the effects social policy conducts on 
faith in other people or public welfare institutions. Although, it is an independent trend in social 
trust research, this field of analysis incorporates the main drawbacks of general studies on the 
welfare state-social trust nexus, which lack empirical analysis which that would help prove or 
disprove the hypothesis about the effects welfare states have on social trust. Another drawback 
inherent to social trust research is the fact that the mechanisms of the effects of the institutional 
design are quite numerous, which makes the analysis cumbersome. There are however some 
differences between the so called ‘institutional’ approach to social trust analysis and the general 
trend mentioned above. While relying on numerous mechanisms, the effects are not controversial 
with respect to the final outcomes. The discussion always concludes that universalism, which is 
associated with non means-testing, has a positive impact on generalized trust, while ‘selectivity’, 
which is based on means-testing, has  a negative relationship with confidence in other people.  
Before starting an overview of the literature on the effects of the institutional design on 
social trust, it should be mentioned that the origins of this analysis stem from the research 
conducted by Rothstein (1998), where he introduces a distinction between universal and selective1 
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 Some scholars name selective welfare states as categorical. 
welfare states. Although this study does not directly elaborate on the effects institutional design 
can have on social trust, Rothstein (1998) draws a detailed scheme of how institutions charged 
with the making and implementation of collective decisions may be designed and how this 
particular design affects the willingness of citizens to assist in realizing the objectives of welfare 
policy. His main contribution consists in showing the advantages of the universal design of welfare 
states, which include a greater (compared to selective ones) redistributive effect. Based on 
calculations of the effects of universal welfare states, Rothstein (1998) comes to a conclusion that 
there is a dramatic reduction in inequality between the highest and the lowest percentiles of income 
distribution. He concludes that this reduction can be achieved with no progressivity in taxation and 
without targeting benefits and services for the truly needy. 
In his other research conducted together with other scholars, he elaborates in more detail 
how the particular design of welfare state programs may explain the kind of influence they conduct 
on social capital. As was said before, in spite of the diversity of studies, they all come to the 
conclusion that crowding-out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes, while universal non 
means-tested schemes usually have a positive influence on social trust levels. The difference 
mainly lies in the diversity of the mechanisms that underlie the relationship in question.  
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) for instance provide explanations which in the form of the  
‘justice enforcement” argument. They argue that universal welfare states are the most effective in 
generating trust since they enable, more than any other system of public policy, the implementation 
of norms of impartiality, fairness, and respect, particularly in comparison to selective or 
conservative public policy systems. General inclusiveness, which excludes discrimination on any 
basis, functions here as an important factor in the development and maintenance of generalized 
trust. The effectiveness of a universal system in generating trust lies in the more transparent 
procedures of implementing social programs as selective systems presuppose a wide range of 
discretionary power which escalates fears of fraud and/or dishonesty into increased control and 
complicated rules of getting social benefits. However, they do not conduct an empirical analysis 
to prove their arguments.  
This idea is developed by Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) who base their analysis in the frame 
of a ‘justice enforcement argument’, although they do limit justice to a procedural interpretation.  
They argue that people are concerned not only with the final results of personal contacts with 
public institutions, but in whether the process that eventually leads to the final results is fair. 
Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) distinguish between several aspects of procedural justice. These may 
involve questions of whether or not an individual is received with respect and dignity; whether he 
or she is able to communicate opinions to civil servants; and whether there are signs of 
discrimination, corruption, and /or cheating. They further argue that needs-tested public services 
may more readily give rise to suspicions concerning procedural justice and arbitrary treatment than 
do universal agencies. In other words, programs based on needs-testing imply a greater scope for 
bureaucratic discretion. Citizens for their part have an incentive and opportunity in this situation 
to withhold relevant information from bureaucrats to try to convince the latter that they should 
qualify for the service in question. This easily escalates into a vicious spiral of distrust from clients 
leading to increased control from bureaucrats. Because of this complex and controversial decision 
making process, needs testing and bureaucratic discretionary power are often more difficult to 
reconcile with the principles of procedural justice compared with universal public services. Their 
empirical analysis explicitly shows the negative relationship between the number of needs-tested 
institutional contacts and the levels of social trust based on the Sweden SOM survey. Their analysis 
was thus limited to one country. Furthermore, they do not prove whether or not the mechanism 
that underlies the phenomenon under study works as they assume, but instead they focus on 
establishing the fact that the number of contacts with means-tested programs negatively correlates 
with generalized trust levels.  
In their further research, scholars focus more on explaining why selective and conservative 
welfare regimes undermine trust among individuals. Unlike a universal one, Rothstein and Stolle 
(2001) argue that both selective and conservative welfare states are designed to plot groups of 
people against each other, which violates the principle of fairness. They use the so called ‘stigma 
creation’ argument to explain how means-testing may ruin social trust among the recipients of 
such benefits. They continue their reasoning by arguing that if citizens are singled out as special 
‘problem’ cases as they are in selective welfare systems, it is possible that the majority of citizens 
might not trust them. This in turn causes ‘problem’ people to be distrustful of others. They also 
explain the development of distrust among clientele of means-tested programs with the 
discriminatory experience they go through when applying for, and receiving relevant benefits.2 
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) conduct an empirical analysis based on SOM data for Sweden for the 
years 1996-2000, which confirms their hypothesis that citizens who use selective welfare state 
services in Sweden are less trusting than the rest of the population. They stop however at this point 
without checking whether means-testing is a negative determinant of social trust with respect to 
all policies or if it can be policy specific. Moreover, their analysis is based exclusively on data for 
one country and ignores the possibility of a cross-national investigation. 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2006) also elaborate on the reasons why universal programs are positive 
in their effects on social trust while selective programs have negative effects. They provide their 
explanation in the frame of reasoning called as the ‘equality promotion’ argument. Equality is 
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 In line with these findings, Mofflat and Higgs argue that the ‘stigmatizing’ of people through means-testing may 
create among participants a feeling of being demeaned by the system that negatively affects their trust level. 
understood as income equality. More specifically, they say that unlike selective social schemes, 
universal schemes may enhance trust. This occurs due to the fact that such programs are much 
better in reducing inequality than simple redistributive schemes that imply selective policies. The 
authors insist that apart from economic equality, one should also take account of the equality of 
opportunities as a determinant of social trust. Universal programs may also ensure this since they 
possess a number of specific characteristics. First, they are delivered with less bureaucratic hassle 
and control. Second, they may create feelings of social cohesion in society. Third, high quality 
universal programs may increase feelings of optimism and equal opportunity among large 
segments of the population. They use a regression analysis to test the effects of means-tested 
benefits on generalized trust. The results meet their expectations and show that being a client of 
means-tested benefit schemes in the United States entails negative effects on trust indexes. 
Moreover, these negative effects on social trust caused by interaction with means-testing 
institutions remain statistically significant even after controlling for the personal characteristics of 
recipients. As in the previous research, they do not elaborate on whether or not the effects of the 
institutional design of benefit schemes on social trust are policy specific. They again base their 
research on an individual level analysis for one country. Apart from that, the authors do not prove 
the mechanism of the effects directly, but rather limit their empirical investigation to general 
statements that claim that experience with means-testing may ruin social trust. They conclude their 
analysis with a pessimistic prediction about the dynamics of trust based on the notion of social 
traps: “social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the public 
policies that could remedy this situation cannot be established precisely because there is a genuine 
lack of trust.”  
In spite of the fact that the question of the relationship between the institutional design and 
social trust receives some attention and is elaborated on to a great extent in the literature, there are 
some problems that require a further analysis. First, the research conducted so far  focuses on 
explaining the mechanisms that underlie effects non means-testing and means-testing have on 
social trust. The empirical analysis that supports the hypothesis is poor and limited to the individual 
level on the basis of two countries: the United States and Sweden. Moreover, scholars merely focus 
on studying whether or not the contact with means-tested programs ruins generalized trust. There 
is no cross-national research based on a wide range of countries that relates spending on non 
means-tested and means-tested benefit schemes to their social trust levels. This analysis is 
necessary since the narrow boundaries of research do not allow for generalizing the findings to the 
rest of the world, which goes far beyond Sweden and the United States.  
Second, the analysis conducted so far generalizes the effects of the institutional design to 
all social policies and ignores the fact that they may be policy specific. Welfare states represent a 
number of policies that differ in their aims, clientele, and effects. A wide range of policies use 
means-testing and it is plausible to assume that the complexity of means-testing and hence the 
strength of its influence on social trust will largely depend on the perception of how deserving 
people who are experiencing social contingencies and hence become the clientele of welfare states 
are. It is also widely known that the deservingness for public support substantially varies across 
social groups for whom the policies are designed. It is hence possible to expect that the effects of 
the institutional design on social trust will be policy specific.  
Third, all studies presented above limit social trust to generalized trust, or confidence in 
other people. It is hence more or less known how a particular institutional design will affect 
interpersonal trust. It remains however ignored that trust itself is a multifaceted concept that has 
several forms. The most common used in empirical research (besides interpersonal trust) is 
institutional trust, which reflects confidence in public welfare institutions. There is no analysis that 
attempts to explain how and why institutional trust may be affected by welfare states in general 
and their institutional design in particular. It is interesting to see whether institutional design 
matters for institutional trust and if so, whether it follows the pattern found for interpersonal trust.3 
Thus, we will try to account for the problems mentioned above and will conduct a cross-
national investigation based on data of 18 OECD countries. We will also check for the policy 
specific effects of institutional design on social trust, while extending the analysis of institutional 
effects to institutional trust.  
 
3. Division of spending between non means-tested and means-tested  
The division of spending between non means-tested and means-tested schemes follows the 
expected distribution. The vast majority of social provisions is provided through non means-tested 
schemes in all countries, especially in conservative and social democratic welfare regimes. Means-
tested benefits account there for only about two percent. In liberal countries, the share of means-
tested schemes in total social spending constitutes almost 25 percent or 5.26 percent of GDP. In 
other words, continental and northern Europe rely on non means-tested benefits, while using 
means-tested scehems as a complementary measure mainly in the case of social assistance. Anglo-
Saxon countries by contrast use the stigmatizing principle in social welfare provisions, which pre-
supposes the dominance of means-tested mechanisms with their sometimes rude procedures of 
defining and monitoring the need for, and the level of, benefits.   
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 There is a study conducted by Rothstein and Stolle (2001) that demonstrates that institutional trust that reflects the 
impartiality of political and social institutions is important for interpersonal trust development. They argue that citizens 
generalize from knowledge about the honesty and impartiality of public officials and the public welfare/legal system 
to other people.  
  
 
 
Table 1.: Average levels of social spending by institutional design, % of GDP   
 Percentage of non means-
tested schemes  
Percentage of means-tested 
schemes 
 
Social democratic  
27.61 1.96 
 
Conservative  
24.21 1.83 
 
Liberal  
16.47 5.26 
Source: Calculated based on Eurostat  
 
 
4. The institutional design and social trust: an aggregated-level analysis 
To some extent, interesting results are obtained when relating the level of spending by 
institutional design to trust indicators (see Table 8.2.). In line with the theory discussed before, 
crowding-in effects are found for interpersonal trust in the case of non means-tested schemes. This 
positive relationship remains even after sequentially controlling for four out of five country-level 
covariates. Only when keeping the inequality level constant does the positive relationship turns 
negative, while remaining statistically significant. First, this proof that social policy influences 
social trust through redistribution. The positive impact of non means-tested schemes is thus mainly 
due to their redistributive effect. Moreover, it is also obvious from the table that the spurious effects 
of redistribution are stronger for universal policies compared to selective ones, which are always 
mentioned in the literature. This supports the equality promotion argument that states that non-
means tested social programs are more effective in reducing income inequality. Second, it supports 
the idea that when redistributive effects are controlled for, the direct effects of social spending on 
interpersonal trust are negative, which is often conceptualized in the ‘crowding-out hypothesis’ 
(Fukuyama, 2000; De Swaan, 1988). The mechanism that underlies the negative partial correlation 
between the two phenomena under study remains a ‘black box’, although the literature assumes 
that it entails an erosion of either civil society or the ability of individuals to cooperate with each 
other. Finally, these results are in line with many findings (Kawachi et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 
1997; Putnam, 1993; Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 2000) that emphasize the detrimental effects of  
income inequality on trust formation process.  
 
Table 2.: The correlation between social trust and measures of universalism and 
categorization: an aggregated-level analysis  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
between 
spending by 
institutional 
design and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractionali
zation  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestant
s  
Spending on non 
means-tested schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
0.132*** 
 
-0.062*** 
 
 
 
0.123*** 
 
-0.057*** 
 
 
 
0.136*** 
 
-0.067*** 
 
 
 
-0.024*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
 
 
0.066*** 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
0.051*** 
 
-0.011 
 
Spending on means-
tested schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.076*** 
 
-0.004 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.064*** 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
 
-0.075*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.093*** 
 
0.017** 
 
 
 
 
-0.045*** 
 
-0.025*** 
The quality of public institutions expressed through corruption has a little effect in the case 
of non means-tested benefits since this way of delivering social provisions does not require intense 
interaction between public welfare institutions and the beneficiaries of social security systems. 
When relating spending on means-testing benefit schemes and interpersonal trust indexes, 
one sees a negative relationship, which is fully in line with the results of recent research. It is hence 
possible to conclude that means-testing tends to erode interpersonal trust even when keeping most 
of country-level characteristics constant. Only when controlling for income inequality level does 
the negative effects turn neutral and lose their significance level. The effect of redistribution is 
smaller here than in the case of non means-tested spending. Controlling for corruption strengthens 
the negative influence of means-tested benefits on interpersonal trust. It is hence possible to 
conclude that what matters in the case of means-tested spending is not their redistributive effects 
but rather the quality of welfare institutions through which the provision of these benefits takes 
place. In corrupt systems, which are known to tolerate bribes and which do not adhere to any norms 
of impartiality, generalized trust cannot thrive (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Putnam, 1993). It confirms the ‘justice enforcement’ argument that assumes the importance of 
impartiality for manipulating trust levels.  
For institutional trust, the effects of institutional design develop their own pattern that 
substantially differs from interpersonal trust. Crowding-out effects are detected when linking 
spending on both non means-tested and means-tested schemes to institutional trust indexes. When 
talking about the relationship with non means-tested spending, the negative sign remains even after 
controlling for fractionalization, country wealth, income inequality, and percentage of Protestants. 
Out of these four covariates, income inequality can be defined as most influential since keeping 
redistributive effects constant substantially increases the absolute value of the negative coefficient 
measuring the direct relationship between non means-tested spending and social trust. What also 
matters for institutional trust is the corruption level. Corruption conducts a spurious effect on the 
relationship between trust and non means-tested spending. Hence, even if interaction with public 
welfare institutions is rare in universal welfare states, the quality of their performance essentially 
predefines the level of institutional trust in society. If corruption levels are controlled for, the direct 
effect of non means-tested spending on institutional trust is neutral, but not negative. Trust in 
public institutions is thus highly determined by the degree of credibility and the fairness of these 
institutions. This can again be considered proof of the justice enforcement argument. Although 
there are not so many studies elaborating on this association, we find a strong correlation (0.747) 
between institutional trust and corruption indexes.  
The relationship between spending on means-tested schemes and institutional trust is also 
found negative and remains so even after keeping fractionalization, country wealth, income 
inequality level and percentage of Protestants constant. Although the ability of means-tested social 
provisions to reduce income inequality is low, their redistributive effects on institutional trust are 
large. A strong effect is again seen in the case of corruption, which is positive and statistically 
significant this time. For institutional trust, it is hence more important how public welfare 
institutions operate or how fairly they treat applicants for means-tested benefits. If institutions are 
characterized as ‘not corrupt’, the effect of means-tested spending on institutional trust is positive. 
It supports the argument provided by Rothstein and Stolle (2001) that suggests that institutional 
trust largely depends on how impartial, just, and fair social and political institutions, which are 
responsible for the implementation of public policies, are.  
Thus, the results indicate that social spending, in any institutional form, can lead to the 
erosion of institutional trust, unless the corruption level in institutions through which social 
provisions are delivered is controlled for. With respect to interpersonal trust, this happens when 
welfare provisions are done through means-tested schemes while non means-tested schemes 
enhance interpersonal trust formation completely in line with the theory. 
 
 
5. The institutional design and social trust: an individual-level analysis  
When moving to an individual-level analysis, we again see mixed results that are not 
completely consistent with our expectations. Our expectations are: 
Hypothesis 1.: Higher spending on non means-tested schemes in countries should be 
associated with higher levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among the population. 
Hypothesis 2.: Higher spending on means-tested schemes in countries should be associated 
with lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among the population. 
At the individual-level analysis, we see again mixed results not completely consistent with 
our expectations (see Table 8.3). The effects of the institutional design on social trust only partially 
coincide with the theory that asserts that crowding-out can be expected in the case of means-tested 
schemes, while crowding-in is usually the outcome when the analysis is focused on non means-
tested schemes. In the case of interpersonal trust, it is true that hassle and control, which are the 
main characteristics of means-testing, tend to erode confidence levels while more universalistic 
approaches to granting social benefits on a universal basis tend to enhance trust levels. The positive 
impact of non means-tested schemes may also arise from the fact that the latter are more efficient 
in poverty reduction than means-tested benefits. 
Table 3.: Impact of the institutional design of benefit schemes on social trust levels: an 
individual-level analysis  
 
 Institutional trust Interpersonal trust  
 
Non means tested 
spending  
Means-tested 
spending  
 Non means tested 
spending  
Means-tested 
spending  
 
 
 
Non means-tested 
spending  
 
Means-tested 
spending   
 
 
0.076*** 
 
 
 
 
0.071*** 
  
0.043*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.064*** 
 
Volunteering  
 
0.125** 0.122**  0.286*** 0.247***  
Sociability  
 
0.416*** 0.429***  0.361*** 0.432***  
Religion 
Catholic  
Protestant  
Other  
 
 
0.225 
0.387 
0.035 
 
0.602 
0.693 
0.312 
  
-0.215*** 
0.066** 
0.050 
 
-0.176*** 
0.029 
0.020 
 
Religiousness 
 
-0.157*** -0.160***  -0.025*** -0.028***  
Gender  
 
0.119** 0.124**  0.062** 0.063**  
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
45 –above  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.133* 
0.170**  
 
Ref/category 
-0.136* 
0.165** 
  
Ref/category 
0.161*** 
0.172*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.169*** 
0.188*** 
 
Education 
Lower 
Middle  
Upper  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.044 
0.118** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.057 
0.116** 
  
Ref/category 
0.085*** 
0.690*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.093*** 
0.675*** 
 
Unemployed  
 
-0.367*** -0.392***  -0.255*** -0.244***  
Income 
1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
4th qu. 
5th qu 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.135* 
0.079 
0.088 
0.045 
 
Ref/category 
0.132* 
0.086 
0.094 
0.069 
  
Ref/category 
0.075** 
0.230*** 
0.437*** 
0.576*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.079** 
0.231*** 
0.434*** 
0.582*** 
 
Variance at level 1  
 
9.265 (0.111) 9.262 (0.111)  Not calculated Not calculated  
Variance at level 2 
 
0.318 (0.022) 0.216 (0.014)  0.220 (0.014)0 0.206 (0.013)  
 Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
More specifically, the coefficient values indicate that an increase in social spending on non 
means-tested schemes by one percent increases the odds of trusting other people by an average of 
3.5 percent when other variables are kept constant. An increase in means-tested schemes by one 
percent leads to a decrease in the odds of trusting by an average of 6.2 percent when other variables 
are held constant. The coefficient on the ratio of non means-tested spending to means-tested 
spending is found to equal 0.007, which confirms that an increase in the provision of benefits on 
non means-tested principles should positively affect interpersonal trust indexes. Thus, complex 
and sometimes humiliating procedures of means-testing might cultivate the feeling of being at a 
disadvantage among those applying for benefits, leading to psychological closure of the 
personality and hence results in less trust in other people.  
With respect to institutional trust, the relationship has a different nature. It seems that the 
institutional design matters little for institutional trust: regardless of whether or not the benefits are 
provided based on means-testing or not, they have a positive influence on trust levels. For 
institutional trust, the fact that the state provides individuals with financial support is hence more 
important than the mechanisms through which it does so. This thus supports the integration 
argument that assumes that if governments guarantee to keep an individual alive and in good health 
when he or she has difficulties, then the individual will feel integrated and as a result his or her 
perception of failing substantially decreases, which forms the necessary grounds for higher 
institutional trust (Szreter, 2002).  
The coefficients point out that an increase in social spending on non means-tested schemes 
by one percent leads to an increase in institutional trust by an average of 0.076 units while an 
increase in means-tested spending by one percent is usually associated with an increase o 0.064 
units in confidence in public welfare institutions. The coefficient on the ratio of non means-tested 
to means-tested spending is estimated at 0.035, which means that in spite of the fact that both types 
of spending lead to crowding-in, non means-tested provisions must have more positive effects on 
institutional trust.  
Hence, the effects of institutional design may differ across trust forms, which has not been 
mentioned before in the literature. One should limit the theory of means-testing to generalized or 
interpersonal trust. Institutional trust develops a completely different type of relationship with 
means-tested social provisions. The effects remain positive even after making a distinction 
between means and non means-tested spending. Regardless of the principles the provision of social 
benefits is based on, they induce positive effects on institutional trust. The fact that public 
institutions give support to those in need positively affects the recipients of public aid and their 
confidence towards these institutions. What becomes important here is how the institutions 
operate. As the aggregated level of analysis shows, the level of corruption conducts an essential 
influence on the relationship between means-tested spending and institutional trust. If the 
institutions are perceived as fair and not corrupt, they gain high regards from the individuals who 
will have higher levels of confidence in them even in the case of means-testing.  
 
6. Interaction of the institutional design with the functional dimension  
It is an open question as to whether the effects of the institutional design are policy specific. 
To shed more light on this, we disaggregate total spending on means-tested and non means-tested 
schemes on functional a basis, thus obtaining the percentage of GDP spent on non means-tested 
and means-tested pension and unemployment schemes. An overview of these spending levels is 
summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 4.: Variation of spending on means-tested and non means-tested unemployment 
and pension schemes by welfare regime type, in % of GDP 
 Pension schemes Unemployment schemes 
Non 
Means-tested 
 
Means-tested Non  
Means-tested  
Means-
tested  
 
Social democratic  
9.28 0.48 3.09 0.22 
 
Conservative  
10.29 0.35 1.58 0.21 
 
Liberal  
5.84 0.78 0.19 0.25 
 
The data suggest that with respect to pensions, countries tend to give preference to non 
means-tested schemes while means–tested schemes are used as a supplementary measure to the 
traditional way of supplying pensions. As expected, liberal welfare regimes take the lead in using 
means-tested scheme, where eleven percent of pension spending is dedicated to means-tested 
pensions. In the other two welfare regimes, this share is much smaller and barely exceeds five 
percent.  
With respect to the institutional design of unemployment schemes, the variation of the 
share of GDP devoted to means-tested schemes is analogous. Here, governments tend to rely more 
on means-testing when providing the unemployed with financial support. In liberal welfare 
regimes, almost 57 percent of unemployment provisions are done through means-tested schemes. 
This percentage varies between six and twelve percent in social democratic and conservative 
welfare regimes. 
  
Table 5.: The correlation between the institutional design of pensions and 
unemployment schemes and social trust: an aggregated-level analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
between 
spending by 
institutional 
design and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractionali
zation  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestants  
Spending on non 
means-tested pension  
schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.458 
 
 
 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.546* 
 
 
 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.444 
 
 
 
 
-0.283 
 
-0.676** 
 
 
 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.052 
 
 
 
 
-0.219 
 
-0.518 
 
 
Spending on means-
tested pension 
schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.058 
 
0.415 
 
 
 
 
 
0.191 
 
0.386 
 
 
 
 
 
0.287 
 
0.710 
 
 
 
 
 
0.303 
 
0.460 
 
 
 
 
 
0.075 
 
0.344 
 
 
 
 
 
0.117 
 
0.382 
 
Spending on non 
means-tested 
unemployment  
schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.318 
 
0.133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.292 
 
0.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.188 
 
0.205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.303 
 
0.460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.203 
 
-0.031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.178 
 
-0.023 
Spending on means-
tested unemployment 
schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
0.232 
 
0.053 
 
 
 
 
 
0.161 
 
0.097 
 
 
 
 
0.158 
 
0.101 
 
 
 
 
0.371 
 
0.106 
 
 
 
 
0.200 
 
-0.064 
 
 
 
 
0.316 
 
0.123 
 Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
The aggregated level of analysis failed to provide statistically significant results although 
the sign in the relationship between the institutional design of the selected provisions and social 
trust varies considerably. More specifically, a negative relationship  is seen between non means-
tested pension schemes and both forms of trust. A positive relationship is found in the case of 
means-tested pension provisions and social trust. The results are completely opposite to what the 
theory asserts.  
The institutional design seems to matter little for unemployment benefits since the 
relationship between relevant types of unemployment spending and social trust is usually positive, 
although the relationship is not statistically significant in any case. Controlling for the five 
covariates changes the significance level of the relationship in question.  
The individual-level effects of the institutional design on social trust provide evidence of a 
clear existence of policy specific effects. When analyzing institutional trust (see Table 8.6.), one 
comes to the conclusion that the institutional design matters. For pension schemes, we have results, 
which are opposite to those for total social spending. More specifically, non means-tested schemes 
are found to crowd-out institutional trust among pensioners, while means-tested pension schemes 
tend to boost confidence in public welfare institutions. For unemployment spending, the division 
between means-tested and non means-tested only partially supports the general hypothesis. The 
former is found to have neutral effect on institutional trust among the unemployed, while the latter 
increases trust levels among the direct recipients of unemployment benefits. 
  
 
 
 
Table 6.: Policy specific effects of the institutional design on institutional trust4 
 Pension spending  Unemployment spending              
 
 
 
Non means-tested Means-tested Non means-tested Means-tested 
Relevant social 
spending  
On pensions  
 
-0.167*** 
  
0.536*** 
 
On unemployment  0.818***  0.053 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
9.985 (0.256) 
 
9.987 (0.256) 
 
10.688 (0.0542) 
 
10.645 (0.540) 
Variance at 
country level  
 
0.495 (0.091) 
 
0.495 (0.101) 
 
0.168 (0.179) 
 
0.588 (0.328) 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey   
 
 
 
In the case of interpersonal trust, only one of the effects is statistically significant (see Table 
8.7.). For pension schemes, the effects of non means-tested pensions are in line with previous 
findings. Namely, they tend to negatively influence trust levels among pensioners. Means-tested 
schemes are found to boost interpersonal trust levels, although none of the coefficients is found to 
be statistically significant. For unemployment schemes, the institutional design seems to matter 
since we have a positive relationship for non means-tested schemes and a neutral relationship for 
means-tested schemes.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those in Table.3. 
Table 7.: Policy specific effects of the institutional design on interpersonal trust5 
 Pension spending  Unemployment spending              
 
 
 
Non means-tested Means-tested Non means-tested Means-tested 
Relevant social 
spending  
On pensions  
 
-0.013 
  
0.187*** 
 
On unemployment  0.060  0.519 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
Not calculated  
 
Not calculated 
 
Not calculated 
 
Not calculated 
Variance at 
country level  
 
0.172 (0.042) 
 
0.206 (0.063) 
 
0.413 (0.259) 
 
0.369 (0.175) 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey   
 
Thus, the effects of institutional design on social trust can be considered policy specific. 
What comes as a surprise here is the negative impact of non means-tested pension spending on 
both interpersonal and institutional trust among pensioners, which coincides with the negative 
relationship found earlier between total pension expenditures and social trust among pensioners. 
Since social trust is an attitudinal variable we will try to explain the negative effects with the theory 
of attitude formation and change. The effects of recent changes in pension levels and conditions 
of delivery may ruin an individual’s level of trust in national pension system and in public 
institutions in general. The latter in turn contributes to people’s negative experience, which may 
also negatively affect their trust in other people.6 
There are however other considerations for the negative impact of non means-tested 
pension spending on social trust. The reason for the negative effect could be a result of a purely 
                                                 
5
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those in Table 3. 
6
 Brehm and Rahn (in Rothstein and Stolle, 2003), for example, found that confidence in institutions has a large effect 
on interpersonal trust. Jamal (2007) as well argues that those individuals who feel existing political institutions are 
adequate in representing their interests are also more likely to feel trusting towards others. Because individuals feel 
that existing political institutions can protect their interest they are more likely to feel secure in trusting others. In 
other words, representative institutions can create the foundation for trust. When citizens feel their rights are protected 
through legal institutions for example they are more inclined to trust others.  
technical problem. In order to obtain the negative correlation, there must be a situation in which 
lower pension spending is associated with higher trust levels and vice versa.  This was the case for 
the selected countries. To explain the possibility of such a situation, one should recall pension 
system characteristics in the countries selected for the analysis. On the one hand, in Scandinavian 
nations, where trust is relatively high, spending on public pensions is relatively moderate (Norway 
-7 % of GDP, Finland -7% of GDP) since in northern countries they managed to build a two or 
three pillar system with public pensions offering only a basic income relative to occupational and 
private pensions. On the other hand, countries where trust levels are relatively low, public pensions 
sometimes constitute the only source of income and are the biggest spending item in social security 
systems. Such countries are France (10 %) and Italy (12% of GDP). This can be equally applied 
to Anglo-Saxon countries, which spend a lot on supporting the elderly and have moderate levels 
of trust (the UK- 10 % of GDP). This is due to the fact that in liberal welfare regimes, pensions 
constitute one of the largest items of social spending and supporting pensioners is integral to their 
social security system. They grant minimum pensions to everyone even if an individual paid 
contributions for a short period of time. This situation results in a negative correlation between 
pension spending and social trust levels.   
There are some questions that arise here. The first is why the effects of non means-tested 
spending on social trust are different for the two social provisions. The first explanation lies in the 
distinct stratification mechanisms. Unemployment policy presupposes that income related benefits 
are paid within a short period of time after which an individual receives social assistance benefits. 
The liberal stratification mechanism hence prevails in the case of unemployment benefits. Pensions 
are almost always income related since they are calculated based on income levels or previous 
contributions to the system. This is directly related to income since how much you contributed 
during your work history depends on how high your income was. This state of affairs suggests that 
pensions have less of a redistributive effect than unemployment benefits. On the other hand, it may 
mean that pensions rest more on the conservative stratification mechanisms than unemployment 
benefits, which seek to preserve the existing class structure. Conservative stratification 
mechanisms are present with respect to pensions not only in conservative welfare state regimes, 
but also in liberal and socialist welfare states. Conservatism, as was demonstrated before, 
negatively affects institutional trust, which is completely in line with the results obtained that show 
a negative statistically significant correlation between non means-tested pensions and institutional 
trust among pensioners.  
Another reason why pensions may negatively affect trust levels is the fact that in many 
countries, pension schemes are more segmented than unemployment schemes. They are usually 
status oriented social insurance schemes in every country regardless of welfare regime type.  
According to Scruggs and Allan (2006a), Finland has 7 occupationally distinct pension schemes, 
France has 9, Ireland has 3, Norway has 6, Italy has 7, etc. Such an approach creates different 
treatment outcomes. The segregation of pension schemes may lead to pensions that are tailored to 
specific clientele, which in turn has a negative effect on social trust. This is because social trust is 
very sensitive to singling out one group of the population and plotting it against another group. 
This makes people feel unequal, which erodes trust levels among pensioners.  
Another other question that arises is why the effects of means-tested expenditures are 
different for the selected social provisions. It should be also noted that in the case of pension 
spending, the effects of means-tested schemes appear to be positive for interpersonal and 
institutional trust. This finding refutes what the theory usually asserts and can be explained by two 
factors. First, the vast majority of pensions are  non means-tested. Means-tested pension schemes 
are mainly used for very poor elderly people for whom obtaining a source of income can outweigh 
the negative consequences of passing through bureaucratic procedures and the hassles inherent to 
means-tested benefits. Second, the complexity of means-testing might depend on society’s 
perception of deservingness and retired people are considered to be most deserving of public help 
(Van Oorschot, 2006). 
In the case of unemployment policy, positive effects of relevant social spending are found 
in both forms of social trust, although they are only statistically significant for non means-tested 
spending. The fact that the state provides the unemployed with financial support might reinforce 
their confidence towards public institutions. Receiving unemployment benefits allows them to 
keep the attained standards of living and not feel abandoned, which in turn helps maintain their 
trust in other people. Means-tested unemployment schemes however must imply more complex 
procedures (compared to means-tested pension schemes) since they show a neutral effect on the 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among  the unemployed. Their complexity may be 
explained by less favorable (compared to pensioners) perceptions of the deservingness of the 
unemployed for state support (Van Oorschot, 2006), which results in more bureaucratic procedures 
of obtaining means-tested unemployment benefits.  
Dissimilar effects of the benefit schemes design on interpersonal and institutional trust 
among pensioners and unemployed people can thus be explained by different perceptions of 
deservingness for state support between pensioners and the unemployed. This might determine the 
complexity of obtaining means-tested benefits and hence their influence on social trust levels. 
 
 
 
Overview and concluding remarks 
Institutional theory asserts that the institutional design of benefit schemes predefines its 
influence on social trust levels. Many studies conclude that non means-tested benefit schemes 
should positively influence interpersonal trust while means-tested ones are expected to be 
negatively associated with confidence in others. The main rationale behind this mechanism rests 
on the idea that the former is more effective in reducing income inequality and guarantying 
equality of opportunities than the latter.  
Our cross-sectional tested this hypothesis for 18 OECD countries and provided evidence 
that only partially supported our expectations in the case of interpersonal trust. The aggregated-
level and individual-level analyses confirm that means-testing usually erodes confidence in other 
people while non means-testing positively affects interpersonal trust levels. The spurious effect of 
redistribution is indeed larger for non means-tested spending although it is also present for social 
spending on means-tested schemes. What appears to matter more for means-tested provisions is 
the quality of the performance of public institutions as measured through their corruption level.  
The results for institutional trust follow a completely different pattern. At the aggregated 
level of analysis, the institutional design of benefit schemes seems to play no essential role since 
both types of spending show a negative relationship to institutional trust indexes. This relationship 
changes considerably and turns positive (even more strongly for means-tested benefits) when the 
spurious effects of corruption are controlled for. Institutional trust thus depends on how fairly the 
institutions through which the provisions of public support occurs are. The individual level of 
analysis proves that whatever the institutional design of benefit schemes is, they tend to enhance 
confidence in public welfare institutions. This shows that the fact that the state supports individuals 
who are in need is more important for institutional trust than the mechanisms through which this 
support is delivered.  
The analysis also indicates that the effects of institutional design can be policy specific. 
Disaggregating social spending on a functional basis may bring completely different results. For 
pension spending, means-testing is found to have a positive impact on both forms of trust. This 
effect is neutral in the case of unemployment means-tested spending. The difference in the effects 
can be explained by the different complexity of means-tested procedures, which in turn depends 
on the perceptions of how deserving those who apply for public support are.  
What remains unexplained here is the negative effect of non means-tested pension spending 
on social trust among pensioners. This contradicts all theoretical reasoning and cannot be easily 
explained. This negative effect is in line with the argument of the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis. But 
the question however remains why this crowding-out hypothesis does not hold true for non means-
tested unemployment spending? And why is it that the sub-sample of pensioners triggers negative 
mechanisms of social spending effects? Finally, what is the exact mechanism of the effects of 
crowding-out of pension spending? It is possible to expect that each social policy develops its own 
relationship with social trust that goes through many direct and indirect links. These links thus 
require more theoretical and empirical analysis for the social sciences to be able to answer the 
questions raised above.  
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